Mozi (Mo Tzu: ca. 490-403 BC) was China's first true philosopher. Mozi pioneered the argumentative essay style and constructed the first normative and political theories. He formulated a pragmatic theory of language that gave classical Chinese philosophy its distinctive character. Speculations about Mozi's origins highlight the social mobility of the era. The best explanation of the rise of Mohism links it to the growth in influence of crafts and guilds in China. Mohism became influential when technical intelligence began to challenge traditional priestcraft in ancient China. The "Warring States" demand for scholars perhaps drew him from the lower ranks of craftsmen. Some stories picture him as a military fortifications expert. His criticisms show that he was also familiar with the Confucian priesthood.
The Confucian defender, Mencius, (371-289 BC) complained that the "words of Mozi and Yang Zhu fill the social world." Mozi advocated utilitarianism (using general welfare as a criterion of the correct daoguiding discourse) and equal concern for everyone. The Mohist movement eventually spawned a school of philosophy of language (called Later Mohists) which in turn influenced the mature form of both Daoism (Zhuangzi ca 360 BC) and Confucianism (Xunzi 298-238 BC).

The core Mohist text has a deliberate argumentative style. It uses a balanced symmetry of expression and repetition that aids memorization and enhances effect. Symmetry and repetition are natural stylistic aids for Classical Chinese, which is an extremely analytic language (one that relies on word order rather than part-of-speech inflections). Three rival accounts of most of the important sections survive in the Mozi.

Objective Standards and Utility


The "craft theory" of Mohism helps us explain the distinctive character of disciplined philosophical thought in China. As the Mohists analyze moral debates, they turn on which standards we should use to guide our execution of moral instructions. Mozi's orientation was that the standards should be measurement-like, e.g., like a carpenter's plumb line or square. Measurement-like standards lend themselves to reliable application. Experts do better than novices, but everyone can get good results. He tries to extend this reliability-based approach to questions of how to fix the reference of moral terms. Mozi does not think of moral philosophy as a search for the ultimate moral principle. It is the searches for a constant standard of moral interpretation and guidance.

Mozi attacks commonsense traditionalism (Confucianism) as a prelude to his argument for the utility standard. The attack shows that traditionalism is unreliable or inconstant. Mozi tells a story of a tribe that kills and eats their first born sons. We cannot, he observes, accept that this tradition is yimoral or renbenevolent. This illustrates, he argues, the error of treating tradition as a standard for the application of such terms. We need some extra-traditional standard to identify which tradition is right. Which should we make the constant social guide (dao)? For it to give constant guidance, we also need measurement-like standards for applying its terms of moral approval.

Mozi then proposed utility as the appropriate measurement standard for these joint purposes. We use it in selecting among moral traditions, neither directly to choose particular actions nor to formulate rules. The body of moral discourse to promote and encourage is the one that leads to social behavior that maximizes general utility. How does he justify the moral status of utility itself? He argues that it is the natural preference (tiannature:sky zhiurge).

Constancy and Nature
The appeal to tian thus becomes an important component of Mozi's argument. In ancient China, tian was the traditional source of political authority ("the mandate of heaven"). Early Confucianism had "naturalized" tian from what many assume was an archaic deity to something more like "the course of nature." Its main characteristic (besides its moral authority) was that it's movement was changconstant.

Mozi exploited both the connotations of tian's authority and its constancy. Traditions are variable-they differ in different places and times. If we don't like its traditions, we can flee from a family, a society, even a kingdom. We cannot similarly escape the constancies of nature. Natural constancies thus become plausible candidates to arbitrate between rival traditions. To say a dao was constant functioned a little like saying it was objectively true.

The constant "natural" urge he identified was a comparatively measurable one-we imagine ourselves "weighing" benefits against harms. Thus, he proposed using the preference for benefit as a reliable, natural standard for choosing and interpreting traditional practices. We count as 'moral' and 'benevolent' those traditional discourses that promote utility. The natural urge to utility, he says, is like a compass or a square. It does not depend on a cultivated intuition or indoctrination.

Moral Reform
Society's moral reform takes place when we reform the social daoguiding discourse. People educated in this discourse internalize its and the resulting disposition is called their devirtuosity. (The compound dao-de is the standard translation of 'ethics'.) Our devirtuosity produces a course of action in actual situations. Whether the course produced by discourse like "When X do Y" is successful or not depends on what we identify as "X" and "not-X" in the situation. For social coordination, we train people to make these distinctions in similar ways. The key to reforming guiding discourse is to reforming how we make distinctions, e.g. the distinction between 'moral' and 'immoral'.

Mozi understands the training process in several related ways. (1) We emphasize or make a different set of distinctions the dominant ones--hence we promote different words as disposition guides. For example, he says the ruler should use the word jianuniversal and not the word biepartial. If he speaks and thinks that way, he will be a more benevolent ruler. Society should make the benefit-promoting words the constant words in our social discourse. (2) We reform how we make the distinctions associated with terms that remain the same. For example, we will assign different things to shiright and feiwrong. (3) We can change the order of terms in the guiding discourse--use it to give different advice.

Reform Impasse
Notice that Mozi's posture as a moral reformer puts him in an argumentative bind that is related to one faced by Utilitarianism in the West. He admits he is challenging existing judgments and intuitions. What is the status of the principle he uses in proposing his alternative? How can he make his alternative seem other than immoral to someone from within that tradition? How can a moral reformer get over the impasse posed by conflicting moral intuitions?

One possibility emerges in another of Mozi's philosophical stories. He uses this story to criticize Confucian pro-family and "partial" moral attitudes. He depicts a conscript leaving his family to make war. It argues that if he were concerned about his family, he would want those to whom he entrusts them to adopt an attitude of universal concern. He would, Mozi argues, not seek out a person with "partial" moral attitudes. His family-centered, partial moral attitude is "inconstant" in the sense that it leads him to prefer that others have universal rather than partial attitudes. He would achieve his "partial" goals only if the public morality were altruistic. Confucian partiality is "inconstant" in that it recommends a public daoguiding discourse that is inconsistent with it. It can not consistently recommend itself as the collective social dao.

Mohist Psychology
Mozi's analysis shows Chinese thought has a notion of morality as independent from social conventions and history. However, it neither ties morality to the familiar Western concept of "reason" nor to principles or maxims that function within a belief-desire psychology. His focus is on the contrasting terms, benefit/harm, not on the sentence "do what maximizes benefit." The concept is a standard against which we measure social discourse as a whole. The standard is not a principle of reason; it is a natural preference distinction. The objects of evaluation are not actions or rules, they are bodies of discourse and widespread courses of action.

The psychological and conceptual structure of Mozi's moral analysis treats human nature as social and malleable. Human malleability derives from our tendency to learn, to mimic, to seek support and approval from those we respect-our social superiors. It derives also from the effect of language on "inner programming."

Mozi promotes renhumanity as the appropriate utilitarian disposition-the virtue of benevolence. He links it to his choice of universal over partial "love." Mozi acknowledges that instilling universal moral concern requires social reinforcement--official promotion and encouragement. Mozi's social theory of shang-tongagreeing with the superior describes the system that brings this about. Here Mozi gives a familiar justification of a system of authority. It will remind us of Thomas Hobbes state of nature.

Political Theory
Why, Mozi asks, do we choose ordered society over anarchy-the original state of nature. His description of the latter is of a state of inefficiency and waste. One important difference from the Western parallel is that Mozi sees humans as naturally moral creatures who disagree on their moral purposes. Prior to society, he says, humans had different yimorality. They end up in conflicts fueled by moral judgments. They cannot agree on what is shiright and feiwrong. It is clear, Mozi says, that the bad situation arises from the absence of a zhangelder. So [we] select a worthy man and name him tian-zinatural master. He then selects others of worth and creates the governing hierarchy. The hierarchy organizes us to harmonizes our yimorality, our use of shithis:right and feinot-this:wrong. We report "up" what we view as shithis:right and feinot-this:wrong; if the superior endorses it (shi-s it) then we all call it shi. If he fei-s it, I do too, even if I originally reported it as shi.

Another difference from Hobbes is the absence from Mozi's account of any notion of law or retributive punishment. The superior punishes people in Mozi's political world for failing to join in the utility-preserving system that coordinates attitudes, but not for violating anything like promulgated rules. He "promulgates" only moral judgments and social agreement is analogous to judicial conformity to precedent and higher court rulings. The judgment that something is shiright is equivalent to choosing it. Society gains through coordination of behavior and the efficiency of a "constant" daoguiding discourse.

While we harmonize our shi-fei judgments with those the ruler, he does not have arbitrary discretion in his assignments of shi-feiright-wrong. He must "conform upward" too and for the ruler the higher authority is tian and the natural standard of utility. Since all humans have access to that natural measurement standard. Ultimately we "conform upward" only when we correctly use the utility standard in judgment. Still, agreement is itself a utilitarian good, so we report our judgments up, and join in the general acceptance of the judgment that comes down.

This difficulty in making the political system coherent illustrates an implicit tension between the reforming utility standard that is accessible to everyone and Mozi's continued need for a traditional social authority. The tension becomes explicit in Mozi's account of three fameasurement standards for yanlanguage. He lists first the model of past sage kings. Second, he observes the importance of standards to which ordinary people have access "through their eyes and ears." Clear, measurement-like standards can be applied by "even the unskillful" with good results. He lists the pragmatic appeal to usefulness third. While it anchors his reform spirit, he clearly recognizes the importance of historical and traditional patterns in determining correct usage.

Pragmatism
Mozi applies his standards in a famous set of arguments concerning 'spirits' and 'fate'. He appeals to what the sage kings and old literature say, what people in general say, using their "eyes and ears" and, most importantly, what effects on behavior will result from saying "spirits exist" vs. " spirits do not exist" or "there is fate" vs. "there is no fate." Mozi acknowledges that there may be no spirits. Still, he argues, the standards of language all weigh in favor of saying 'exists' of them. He characterizes his conclusion as knowing the daoway of 'existence-nonexistence'. Knowing how to deploy this distinction is knowing to say 'exists' of spirits and 'does not exist' of fate. We change the content of discourse via making the 'exist-not exist' distinction in a particular way.

Mohism died out when the emerging imperial dynastic system promoted a Confucian orthodoxy. Mozi's long-term influence is controversial. Confucian histories treat Mohism as a brief, inconsequential interlude of "Western Style thought." However, his influence arguably shaped Confucian orthodoxy as much as Confucius did. Mozi forced later classical Confucians thinkers to defend their normative theory philosophically and in doing so, they adopted his terms of analysis and many of his key ethical attitudes. Paradoxically, the vehicle for the absorption of Mohist ideas was his chief detractor, Mencius, who effectively abandoned traditionalism and constructed a Confucian version of benevolence-based naturalism that was implicitly universal.

Daoism, similarly, grew out of a relativistic analysis of the Confucian-Mohist debate. Arguably, we owe to Mozi the fact that Chinese philosophy exists. Without him, Confucianism might never have risen above "wise man" sayings and Daoism might have languished as nothing more than a "Yellow Emperor" cult.


http://www.chinakongzi.com/2550/eng/mozi.htm
下面的网页是从英语自动翻译过来的:

墨子(墨子:钙.公元前490-403),是我国第一部真正的哲学家. 墨子开创的风格和建造的第一征文追根究底规范政治理论. 他制定了务实主义的语言介绍了中国古典哲学的特色. 推测墨子的起源凸显社会流动的时代. 崛起的最好说明墨通它的增长影响手工艺协会在中国. 墨成为有影响的技术情报时开始挑战传统priestcraft古代. "战国"也许提请他要求学者从下层工匠. 图画故事,他是一个有军事要塞专家. 他表明,他也批评儒家熟悉神职人员.
儒家辩护人、孟子(公元前371-289)抱怨说:"杨朱、墨子的话说,填补社会世界"; 墨子主张功利主义(以普遍福利为标准的正确daoguiding话语)和人人平等的关怀. 墨家运动最终引起了学校的语言哲学(后来称为墨家),从而影响了成熟双方形成道教(庄子证公元前360公元前298-238)和儒家(荀子).
墨文故意核心追根究底风格. 它以平衡对称的言论和重复,并加强艾滋病背诵效果. 对称性和重复是自然古文文体器材、这是一个极其语解析(一靠词序而非词类语调). 三个对手占多数的墨子生存的重要路段.

客观标准和公用事业

"船论"墨学可以帮助我们解释本色纪律哲学思想在中国. 由于墨家剖析道德辩论我们应该把他们所使用的标准来指导我们的道德执行指令. 墨子的方向应该是衡量标准一样,例如像一个木匠的铅垂线或广场. 测量类标准本身的可靠应用. 专家做得比生手,但每个人都可以得到良好的效果. 他试图把这种可靠的办法来解决问题,如何从道德的范围. 墨子不认为道德哲学为寻找最终的道德原则. 它是一个不断寻找道德水准诠释和指导.
墨子攻击常识传统(儒学)作为他的论点的前奏公用标准. 这次袭击表明传统是靠不住或无常. 墨子的故事讲述自己的部落,先出生的儿子杀死并品尝. 我们不能,他指出,接受这个传统是yimoral或renbenevolent. 这就说明,他说,传统的治疗为标准误差为适用这些条款. 我们需要一些额外的传统标准,找出其中的传统是正确的. 我们应该引导社会不断(道)? 它给固定的指导下,我们还需要测量样的道德标准,运用其职权批准.
墨子则提出适当的计量标准公用联合用途. 我们选拔使用的传统道德,也没有直接选择特定的行动制订规则. 正文道德话语是一个促进和鼓励,使一般社会行为最大限度公用事业. 他怎么辩解事业本身的道德地位? 他认为这是自然的喜好(tiannature:天空zhiurge).
恒常性、
呼吁田成为重要组成墨子的说法. 在中国古代,武则天是传统政治权威的来源("天命"). 早期儒家有"归"添许多假设是什么东西更像一个古老的神"的过程大自然." 其主要特点是(除了其道德权威),它的行动却changconstant.
墨子田开采的内涵的权威及其恒常. 传统的可变他们在不同的地点和时间. 如果我们不喜欢自己的传统,我们可以逃离了家庭,一个社会,甚至一个王国. 同样不能逃脱constancies自然. constancies考生自然成为美丽的传统对手之间进行仲裁. 说是道恒运作有点像说是客观事实.
不断的"自然"是一个相对衡量敦促他发现一个我们想象自己"重量"反对危害好处. 因此,他建议用偏好受益作为一个可靠、自然选择的标准和解释的传统习俗. 我们算作'道德','善'的传统话语,促进事业. 公用事业的自然冲动,他说,就像一个指南针或方形. 它不是靠直觉了耕地或说教.
德育改革
社会道德改革发生在我们的社会改革daoguiding话语. 人本教育内部的话语和由此叫他们devirtuosity处置. (复方道德标准,是翻译的伦理').我们当然devirtuosity产生实际行动. 制作过程是否话语像"当X做Y"型成功与否取决于我们确定作为"×"、"不×"的局面. 协调社会,我们培养人才做出这些区分方式类似. 改革的关键在于我们如何引导话语是改革做出优,例如 区分'道德'、'不道德的'.
墨子理解的训练过程几个相关办法. (1)我们强调或作出不同的区分为主的--所以我们提倡不同语言配置向导. 他举例,执政者应该用字不jianuniversalbiepartial字. 他认为,如果这样讲,他将是一个更仁慈的统治者. 社会要造福促词话不断在社会话语. (二)如何使我们的改革与优条款不变. 举例来说,我们会把不同的东西,shirightfeiwrong. (3)我们可以改变职权主义的指导话语秩序--用它来作不同的意见.
改革陷入僵局
看到墨子的姿态把他作为一个改革者追根究底道德约束,涉及面之一在西方的功利主义. 他坦承自己是直觉判断和挑战现有. 什么是劫机犯的身份提出自己的原则吗? 如何使自己以外的替代似乎不道德,有人从传统? 道德改革者如何摆脱僵局造成的道德直觉矛盾?
另一种可能性是发生在墨子的哲学故事. 他用这个故事来批评儒家亲家庭"部分"道德观念. 他描绘了义务兵家属做出离开战争. 它辩称,如果他关心家人、他希望这些人托他们采取的态度普遍关注. 他会墨子论证,不是找一个人有了"偏"道德观念. 家人为本偏道德态度是"无常"的意思,他宁愿别人已领先世界,而非局部的态度. 他会实现他的"偏"目标只有公共道德利他人. 孔子是偏袒"北极",它建议公共daoguiding话语即触. 它始终不能推荐自己为集体社会道.
墨子心理学
墨子的分析表明中国思想道德观念作为一个相对独立的社会公约和历史. 但是它既关系到熟悉西方道德观"原因"的原则或格言,功能也不一个信念-愿望精神科格雷. 其重点是在对比来看,受益/伤害,就不是一句"做最大好处" 这是一个标准的概念,对我们社会的话语作为一个整体措施. 标准不是一个理性的原则;这是自然选择的区别. 评价的对象不行动或规则,他们的尸体话语和普遍的行动.
墨子的心理结构和概念的道德分析对待社会和人性可塑性. 人类源自我们倾向于可塑性学习,模仿,寻求支持和肯定,我们从这些方面,我们的社会产物. 它指的效果也从语言"内编程"
墨子提倡功利renhumanity为适当处置-德善. 联系到他自己选择普遍较偏"爱" 墨子承认灌输社会普遍的道德要求增援关注--官方推广和鼓励. 墨子的社会理论尚tongagreeing与上级形容这种体制带来什么. 墨子则熟悉这里的理由制度权威. 它提醒我们霍布斯自然状态.
政治理论
因此,墨子要求,我们选择了无政府状态秩序井然-原自然状态. 他形容后者是一个国家的效率与浪费. 一个重要的区别是,西方平行墨子认为人类道德作为自然分解者往往就道德目的. 此前,他说,人类有不同yimorality. 到头来冲突蔚然成风道德判断. 什么是他们不能同意和shirightfeiwrong. 显然,墨子说,恶劣的情况出现,没有一个zhangelder. 所以要把他的名字和选择一个值得男子添zinatural大师. 然后,他选择了别人创造价值、理事等级. 我们举办的高层协调yimorality、以shithis:正确feinot-:不对. 我们报告"上升"我们认为shithis:正确feinot这个:错误的;当上级肯定它(诗收盘)然后我们都称之为诗. 如果他飞收盘它,我太,就算我本来是报施.
另一个是没有区别霍布斯从墨子的任何帐户或报复性处罚法的概念. 上级人民惩罚墨子的政治未能参加世界公用事业保存坐标系统态度但不能违反什么规则出台. 他"公布"只是道德判断和社会司法协定好比符合上级法院判决、先例. 判决书说是一件shiright等于选择. 通过协调社会利益的行为和工作效率的"恒"daoguiding话语.
虽然我们有的放矢地时飞与判断的尺子他没有在他的随意转让诗feiright-错. 他必须"符合向上"太对上级的统治者与天然田标准实用. 自从人类获得一切自然测量标准. 我们最终"符合向上"只有当我们正确运用判断标准事业. 但协议本身是功利良好,所以我们判断报告,参加验收和一般的判断出来.
这一困难使政治制度之间的紧张连贯显示含蓄公用事业改革就是无障碍标准大家和墨子的社会仍然需要一个传统权威. 紧张变得明确墨子的三到yanlanguagefameasurement标准. 他首先列举了过去圣者之王模式. 其次,他观察到一般人的标准,获得"通过他们的眼睛和耳朵" 明确测量标准一样可应用于"不熟练甚至"收到了良好效果. 他列举了三语呼吁用处. 虽然他的主播和改革精神,他清楚地认识到历史和传统格局确定正确用法.
实用主义
墨子其标准适用于著名的争论'神','命运'. 他呼吁什么圣人国王和旧文学说些什么,在一般人说,他们利用"耳目",以及最重要哪些行为将导致对他说:"神存在"矛"神不存在"或"有命"与"毫无命" 墨子承认可能没有消沉. 但他辩称,语言标准衡量一切主张说『存在』. 他的特点是他的结论明知daoway'存在不存在'. 懂得这个区分不知要说部署'存在'的精神和'不存在'的命运. 要变更内容,经话语使'存在不存在'某种方式的区别.
墨皇去世时出现系统提拔了儒家正统朝代. 墨子的长期影响还有争议. 儒家墨家作为参考资料对待历史,桩桩插曲"西式思维" 不过,他的影响力可以说形孔子儒家正统高达那样. 墨子后来被迫儒家经典规范理论的哲学思想家和捍卫这样他们通过自己的分析和很多他的主要道德观念. 矛盾的是,车辆是他的意念吸收墨家撤回行政、孟子抛弃传统,建成了卓有成效版儒家仁为本自然是含蓄普遍.
道教,同样,成长出了相对论分析儒家-墨子辩论. 可以说,我们应该为中国哲学墨子事实存在. 没有他,儒学可能永远超越"智者"言论与道教可能冷落而已"黄皇帝"邪教.

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此主题已被 墨家行者 在 2007-07-23, 22:57 时间编辑过

帖子删了。



买糕的，俺服了优，你发到广告版里去行么？小鸡还挺硬的。

此主题已被 墨家行者 在 2007-08-7, 20:37 时间编辑过

删！！！

此主题已被 墨家行者 在 2007-08-13, 20:41 时间编辑过